Obsessed with Numbers

Since the signing of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961, the international community created a full international legal framework for global drug control. Over the years, a number of conventions and protocols have further developed the global substance control regime through the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.³

The 1998 United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) further reinforced the global approach to eliminating illicit crops and set a 10-year target to destroy or significantly reduce the cultivation of coca, cannabis and opium.⁴ From that moment, various international institutions set out to accomplish the goal. In its Resolution 42/3, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) requested that UNODC design mechanisms for monitoring and verifying information regarding illicit crop cultivation, to work with governments and eliminate these crops..⁵

This led to the creation of the Global Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP), whose objective is to‘establish methodologies for data collection and analysis, aiming to increase the capacity of governments to monitor illicit crops in their territories. In addition, the program seeks to assist the international community in monitoring the extent and evolution of illicit crops, within the context of the elimination strategy adopted by Member States.’.⁶ Since then, UNODC publishes annual reports in the monitored countries that provide information on the number of hectares planted, the crops destroyed, the yield and their market value.

The strategy of crop elimination has been implemented for decades in Latin America, especially but not exclusively in the Andean region. The United States (US) intensified its promotion of aggressive anti-crop policies by funding and accompanying military and logistical operations to eradicate coca crops in order to prevent drugs from reaching the streets of its cities.⁷ Regarding coca crops, ICMP has been implemented exclusively in Peru, Colombia and Bolivia, except two reports on Ecuador. The three countries grow virtually all of the world’s coca leaf due to the climate and soil conditions, as well as the region’s ecosystems that provide fertile ground for the plant. Moreover, these countries have grown coca for centuries, to provide for its traditional uses, so a percentage of the crop is meant for local consumption, especially in Peru and Bolivia. Although Bolivia and Peru were originally the largest producers of coca (since its traditional use is more widespread than in Colombia), cultivation of the crop expanded significantly in Colombia in the late 1980s, and it is currently the country with the highest production. The World Drug Report 2021 ⁸ estimates that Colombia produces 64 per cent of the world’s cocaine, mainly destined for the United States and Europe (see graph on coca cultivation).

Source: World Drug Report, 2021

Several years before UNODC launched ICMP, the US government declared a war on drugs at home and abroad. Operations included forced eradication and crop substitution programmes as well as the detection and seizure of drug shipments, with the aim of preventing drugs from reaching the country. On 18 June 1971, US President Richard Nixon addressed a press conference accompanied by members of his cabinet, frowning, he told the audience categorically: ‘America’s public enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse’.⁹ The speech had a clear purpose – to launch a policy aimed at combating illegal drug use by attacking the supply of substances not only in the United States but also beyond its own borders. US rhetoric gained dominance and exerted considerable influence on the international drug control regime, which intensified its struggle to combat drug supply¹⁰

In 1989, the US began offering military assistance to Andean countries through the Andean Initiative, with a logic of dependency whereby the northern government provided economic assistance in exchange for positive results in coca crop reduction. Since then, each country must meet a minimum set of demands and achievements in order to receive US certification, which then allows them to access resources and ensure the continuity of economic and military aid.¹¹

For example, under the auspices of the US government (which provided training for the Bolivian armed forces), in the 1990s Bolivia implemented Plan Dignidad [Dignity Plan] with the aim of destroying all crops in the Chapare region.¹² In recent years, Colombia has possibly become the country most dependent on the US in the race to destroy crops, since the South American country is the biggest cocaine producer. The US instituted a strategy to reduce supply through manual eradication and aerial spraying, which materialised in Plan Colombia, a programme that began in 1999 through which the US government invested close to $5 billion in military and logistical assistance to control cocaine production.¹³

This pressure persists in the three countries studied in this briefing paper – Peru, Colombia and Bolivia. The ICMP monitoring reports are used as a source of information to evaluate the success and/or failure of policies, and are therefore carry a lot of weight in the decision to certify the countries. Each year, when the reports are published, governments use the opportunity to reinforce coercive measures – when cultivation numbers increase in comparison with the previous period – or to demonstrate satisfaction when the opposite is shown.

The US has its own monitoring system through the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which, together with ICMP, gives permission not only for continued aid but also for access to free trade benefits. Since 1991, several Latin American countries have been tied to US certification through the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), which grants benefits and preferential access to the US market for different products, based on compliance with crop reduction demands. ¹⁴

Despite the efforts and resources invested, ICMP’s results after two decades are far from its aims. Partly due to foreign pressure but also to their own conviction, Latin American governments insist on continuing with this control and forced erradication policy, despite evidence of its ineffectiveness. The number of people who use drugs around the world has increased by 22 per cent over the last decade, as has the supply of substances, their production methods and trafficking.¹⁵  In the case of coca, despite a reduction in the number of hectares dedicated to the crop, producers have perfected processing methods and they cross, select and treat plants to amplify the potential cultivation areas, with the aim of achieving higher yields and increasing productivity with the same inputs.¹⁶  For example, the last ICMP report on Colombia shows that while there was a 7 per cent reduction in the surface area planted with coca in the country, coca paste production increased from 1,137 metric tonnes in 2019 to 1,228 metric tonnes in 2020.¹⁷

Meanwhile, the collateral damage from forced eradication sometimes outweighs the policy’s gains. Eradicated crops are often replanted in the same place or in other regions or natural parks protected for their environmental value (known as the balloon effect), resulting in environmental damage and public health problems, especially in Colombia where aerial herbicide spraying campaigns have been carried out.¹⁸ Furthermore, crop eradication and destruction policies have created political instability and cycles of violence between affected communities, organised traffickers and governments. Finally, but no less serious, in their eagerness to demonstrate good results, eradication campaigns have led to clashes with communities, indiscriminate use of violence, imprisonment, torture and extrajudicial executions. This reduction in supply also means a head-on battle against the weakest link in the drug trafficking chain – vulnerable communities and families who, due to state neglect, depend on these crops for their livelihoods.¹⁹ Crop control, therefore, has led to repeated human rights violations including torture, extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detention and displacement.

The deployment of unsuccessful measures to enforce crop reduction has continued, despite the failure to attain the 1998 UNGASS target and the extension of the deadline for a further 10 years.²⁰ The drug market has resisted efforts to eradicate crops; consumption and production rates are on the rise, and human rights violations persist. The following section explores the specific cases of Peru, Colombia and Bolivia, countries where the UN monitoring system continues to operate, and explores how this tool has helped governments evaluate the effectiveness or otherwise of their drug policies.

Peru has carried out coca cultivation monitoring with UNODC’s technical support since 2001. However, the country has been part of the Global Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP) since 1999, when an agreement signed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs (DEVIDA for its acronym in Spanish) and UNODC ratified Project AD/PER/02/G34 ‘Illicit Crop Monitoring System in Peru’. Eighteen reports have been published to date, including the 2018 and 2019 reports that were submitted in November 2020. DEVIDA has carried out ICMP since monitoring began, along with other institutions including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the European Union (EU) and the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ for its acronym in German).

According to DEVIDA, the main drug policy indicator has been the amount and volume of coca production and its derivatives, estimated from annual monitoring. A large part of the drug policy that Peru implements through DEVIDA and other relevant public bodies is based on this measurement or monitoring. For the Peruvian agency, coca crop monitoring ‘is a management tool that aims to integrate and standardise the gathering, recording, management and consultation of data, databases and statistics, by interacting with other systems that manage information in the institutional and multisectoral sphere of the fight against drugs, to facilitate the tracking, monitoring and evaluation of the anti-drug policy.’.²¹

This idea was ratified in Legislative Decree 1241 enacted on 25 September 2015, which strengthens the fight against illicit drug trafficking. The decree insists on the need for‘periodic and methodical monitoring of coca bush cultivation to measure its surface area, define its geographical distribution, estimate its density and yield per hectare, observe and compile data on its historical evolution to optimise public decision-making within the Anti-Drug Policy framework.²²

In 2004, the Special Multistakeholder Commission responsible for evaluating the situation in the Peruvian coca-growing basins²³,concluded that, ‘the national institutions directly linked to the coca-growing problem, including DEVIDA, ENACO and the Ministry of the Interior (through the CORAH Special Programme) do not have their own methodology for measuring coca-growing areas, nor do they have their own homogeneous statistical data on the total hectares of coca crops. They rely on information from international organisations such as the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Assistance Office and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which use modern technology and scientific methods to provide baseline data on coca cultivation areas as of 2003.²⁴

This same 2004 report reflects that ‘…the country’s lack of own methodologies for evaluating surfaces cultivated with coca is a technical gap. The relevant state institutions should be encouraged to develop a methodology whose data will serve as the basis for designing plans and programmes as well as the national anti-drugs strategy. Until this is in place, UN methodology should be used, as it is the most appropriate and it is mentioned in a bilateral agreement. Thus, until the country’s own methodology is developed, the results provided by the UN should be considered official.’²⁵

Peruvian institutions and the Peruvian government have therefore kept track of the areas with coca cultivation using the UN monitoring system. According to former DEVIDA Executive Director Fidel Pintado, the reports ‘analyse and interpret all the coca-growing areas of the country (14 coca-growing areas) and identify the crops in production (10 to 12 months after their planting). The identified cultivations are reviewed, verified and adjusted based on information collected in the field and/or with higher resolution images, such as PERUSAT, PLEIADES, KOMPSAT and overlays of other map sources.’²⁶

Furthermore, Pintado adds that verification takes place at the third stage of the methodology for the report in two ways: cross-checking by experts and cross-checking with complementary tools. The former refers to complementary verification by another specialist, while the latter is carried out through field observation, cross-checking with higher resolution satellite images or cross-checking with aerial photographic images.

Although most monitoring reports generally describe the areas where coca is cultivated, recent documents have added other variables, such as the demand for coca leaf for traditional and industrial purposes, and they have included detail on the methodology used. This new methodology – implemented for the 2018 and 2019 crop monitoring – was carried out in 14 coca-growing areas or basins and 13 departments or regions of the country. It drew on the knowledge and experiences developed by UNODC and eight other public institutions that form part of the Multistakeholder Working Group (GTM for its acronym in Spanish) led by DEVIDA.

The public institutions participating in the working group are: DEVIDA’s Technical Affairs Directorate (DAT for its acronym in Spanish); the Ministry of Interior’s General Directorate Against Organised Crime; the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate for the Control and Reduction of Coca Cultivation in Alto Huallaga (CORAH for its acronym in Spanish); the Peruvian National Police’s Anti-Drugs Directorate; the Peruvian National Police’s Criminalistics Directorate; the Peruvian Air Force’s Aerospace Control Command (COMCA/FAP for its acronym in Spanish); the Ministry of Defence’s National Commission for Aerospace Research and Development (CONIDA for its acronym in Spanish); and the National Coca Company (ENACO for its acronym in Spanish).

It is worth noting that this group also includes private sector institutions such as companies, producer organisations, grassroots organisations, academic centres and non-governmental organisations.

According to DEVIDA, the crop estimation methodology used for 2018 and 2019 is ‘the first of its kind at the national level’ and has UNODC’s endorsement, which, ‘based on its expertise, guarantees compliance with international methodological standards and the requirements of the international community’ regarding the monitoring of coca crops in production, ‘thus officialising the results of the monitoring’. The methodology consists of six main steps: 1) acquiring digital satellite images; 2) image processing; 3) visual interpretation of the images; 4) systematisation and analysis of the results; 5) approving the analysis of the area of coca leaf cultivation; and 6) disseminating the results.  DEVIDA asserts that ‘the practical implementation of this methodology will make it possible to officially recognise the results obtained during monitoring’. It adds that it is a ‘pioneering national methodology … that guarantees rigour in the production of information, systematisation, analysis, presentation and official recognition of the results of monitoring coca leaf production.’

DEVIDA and UNODC have worked closely since the beginning of the monitoring programme in Peru. Thanks to UNODC’s international support, DEVIDA receives funds enabling it to operate. Each year, agencies obtain funds from their governments by demonstrating ‘achievements’ in crop reduction or ‘numbers of producers benefiting’ from the ‘alternative development’ programmes they promote. Since Romulo Pizarro’s entry as Director of DEVIDA in 2002, the agency received a higher commitment of public funding for the fight against illicit drug trafficking, a situation that created various inter-institutional discussions and conflicts.

Tensions have especially emerged in relation to the Alternative Development programmes, due to competition with USAID – whose idea is ‘eradicate first, then develop’ – but also with the German, Canadian and EU aid programmes that promote ‘development first, then concerted crop reduction’.

Regarding the estimation of coca crops, both the Peruvian State (through DEVIDA) and the different international aid agencies have been obliged to demonstrate ‘achievements’ in the reduction of illicit crops, seen as the ‘silver bullet’ of good behaviour. To this end, the annual estimates provided by the highly technical and sophisticated DEVIDA-UNODC reports on the presence of the crop have been used to justify new funding.

Over the past two decades, estimation has made it possible to design or correct public policies aimed at reducing supply, as well as to confirm Peru’s commitments with international conventions. However, crop eradication efforts have not resulted in a general reduction of cultivated areas. On the contrary, a number of flaws in the system were made apparent during this time, leading to the following conclusions:

• Coca leaf production has increased or remained steady.
• Some planting areas have moved to other river basins (‘balloon effect’), dispersed in the same basins (‘mercury effect’) or moved to the border regions with Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador (‘membrane effect’).
• There have been growing linkages and synergies with other criminal activities such as illegal logging, informal-illegal mining, human trafficking, smuggling, land trafficking, illegal animal and plant trade, contract killings and money and asset laundering. Campaigns to reduce supply have had significant impacts on society, natural resources, the economy and the culture of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in production areas.
• The so-called Alternative Development efforts, policies and strategies have failed.
• The coercive approach has proven a major obstacle to promoting the beneficial traditional and industrial use of coca leaf as a natural resource, a valuable practice and a symbol of the identity of Andean-Amazonian peoples. The National Coca Company (ENACO for its acronym in Spanish) also needs it to properly function as a public entity that legally collects and markets coca and its legal derivatives.
• More recently, with the COVID-19 health emergency, coca cultivation destined for the illicit drug trade has soared, along with associated crimes. This highlights the failures of a policy based on supply, national security and the criminalisation of its production and use.

The reflections above call for a review of the results and an analysis of the methodology used to prepare the reports, not only with regard to crop eradication, but also in relation to the impact of this policy on the criminalisation of coca growers, the stigmatisation of traditional coca leaf consumers and its beneficial industrialisation. An assessment must also be made of the limited results of the Alternative Development programmes, which seek to replace crops with other sources of income.

The Colombian crop monitoring programme began in 1999 with logistics support from the Anti-Narcotics Police of the time (DIRAN for its acronym in Spanish) and in coordination with the National Narcotics Department (DNE for its acronym in Spanish). However, a monitoring programme with 100 per cent official coverage was only set up starting 1 November 2001. According to UNODC, full coverage of the entire national territory was achieved using Landsat and SPOT satellite imagery taken over a period of time. For example, images used in 2002 were taken between August 2002 and January 2003. These images were later corroborated through field research. The images, however, were not useful in calculating opium poppy, due to persistent cloud cover in the production areas.

In accordance with the Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (ICMP), the data obtained is handed over to the relevant authorities in order to develop actions and projects to preserve the ecosystems that are of strategic importance for the country. As stated in the 2002 Report, ICMP’s objectives are to:

• to establish methodologies for data collection and analysis,
• to increase the governments’ capacity to monitor illicit crops on their territories,
• to assist the international community in monitoring the extent and evolution of illicit crops in the context of the elimination strategy adopted by the Member States at the General Assembly Special Session on Drugs in June 1998.²⁷At the time, monitoring was neither neutral nor an autonomous activity; rather it was embedded in the 1998 UNGASS global strategy to eradicate crops deemed illicit in 10 years, i.e. by 2008. This goal coincided with the implementation of Plan Colombia, which sought the reduction of illicit crops as a form of attacking one of the guerrillas’ main sources of funds. Then President Álvaro Uribe promoted aerial herbicide spraying with two strategic objectives: to destroy the guerrillas’ war economy – especially that of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC for its acronym in Spanish), and to fulfil the UNGASS 1998 mandate for the total elimination of illicit crops.Over time, ICMP in Colombia has undergone transformations and methodological adjustments to improve the quality of the data. However, the reports have generally maintained a quantitative focus. For example, specific department-level baselines were set regarding the number of hectares and density of cultivation starting in 2002, which facilitated the identification of trends such as decreases, increases, and changes in density based on calculating the number of hectares per square kilometre. Other variables included eradication (aerial spraying), fallowing (resting of used land), abandonment or voluntary eradication. Additionally, departments were grouped into ‘regions’ in order to present the measurements. The reports provided information about the varieties of coca (although without further detail on their characteristics and yields); the correlation between hectares of coca, plants per hectare, and the potential for cocaine hydrochloride production; and the price structure of coca paste. The sequence of aerial eradications in relation to cultivated areas was also included to show the effectiveness of spraying. Finally, differentiated information about the presence of illicit crops in national parks and indigenous territories was provided since 2001, due to the legal limitations and challenges that these areas pose when it comes to eradication.Over the years, reports have included other variables in an attempt to find a correlation between the presence of illicit crops and socio-economic conditions, armed conflict and the political environment. For example, information was provided on rural poverty and the presence of illicit crops, as well as the relation between rural poverty and Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) in the monitored regions. Other variables relevant to the Colombian case were also inserted, such as crop cultivation areas and the presence of armed groups, as well as forced displacement due to the conflict. Significantly, the reports recognise aerial spraying as a factor driving the exodus of people from their territories.Political influences are apparent in the reports, as many of the variables originally included became more nuanced. At that time, President Álvaro Uribe’s government embarked on a rhetorical denial of the armed conflict, and the reports – although they continue to mention variables such as the presence of armed groups and forced displacement – limit themselves to providing numbers without any in-depth analysis while increasingly focusing on reporting on the reduction of supply. (See the detailed table with the evolution of the reports in Ricardo Vargas’ full report, Spanish only).

During the 20 years’ implementation of ICMP in Colombia, one can observe the governments’ emphases and perspectives on the management of illicit crops, and how these are adapted to the ICMP reports. For example, the 2017 report speaks more clearly about the relationship between multidimensional poverty and illicit crops. It states, ‘municipalities affected by illicit crops recorded a rural multidimensional poverty index (RMPI) of 54.72 per cent. This is 15.7 per cent higher than the average for non-coca producing municipalities.’²⁸ This statement is an example of the type of narrative that was made possible by the December 2016 signing of Peace Accord.

Despite the introduction of new categories and data collection methodologies, the technical fine-tuning primarily focuses on improving the precision of quantitative data regarding the crops. Although the first reports (especially the 2002 report) sought an all-encompassing approach bringing in elements of sociology, political economy and recognising the impact of the armed conflict, this perspective was abandoned in favour of a highly technical information-gathering structure.

Meanwhile, none of the reports mention the legal or traditionally use of coca, instead focusing on the presence of illegal coca in indigenous territories without any distinction whatsoever. Additionally, there are very few mentions of other types of illegal economies. It is worth noting that in 2003, UNODC signed an agreement with the Colombian government that – although contributing to its financial stability – allows for the interference of governmental interests based on the confluence of common objectives; from the very beginning, the 1998 UNGASS mandate enabled this situation. This is clear across all reports.

Alternative Development seems to be primarily a supply reduction policy; mentions of the programme provide a predominantly governmental perspective, without critical perspectives from the communities. This is very common throughout the reports, where communities are treated as an object or a means to obtain information about coca (yield, processing, agricultural management); at no time are local voices from affected people included.

It is striking that over the decades, illicit crops are not addressed as a symptom of the imbalances in access to land and the recurrent marginality of rural areas – an issue regarding the agrarian model in general, and particularly in areas where the crops are grown. Instead, illicit crops are seen as a threatening external factor, an evil that requires their detailed and anticipated discovery. Today, this is embodied in the narratives about the risks that these crops represent in the territories, a situation that must be measured by means of a mechanism known as risk analysis. Accordingly, UNODC’s narrative makes the case for the risk posed by coca cultivation and offers solutions to addressing it. This risk analysis is defined as ‘a geographical tool that allows for the provision of support for the planning and management of institutional programmes or projects designed to consolidate zones that are free from illicit crops.’²⁹> The analysis stems from the need to have information on the future probability of an area being cultivated with coca.

This allows UNODC to focus efforts on reducing illicit cultivation and supporting Alternative Development projects in areas that demonstrate the need to provide growers’ communities with economic alternatives. The study proposes a comprehensive understanding of socio-spatial transformations, focusing on current and future risk due to the presence of coca cultivation. The risk model is the calculation of a probability that combines the real threat of coca cultivation with the consequences on the vulnerability of the territory. Assessments of threat due to vulnerability have led to the development of a quantitative scale with degrees of risk, from very high to very low. The assumption of risk uses a morbid language for territories (an external disease that attacks them), promoting and legitimising the concept of impact, or affected, in places where illicit crops are already grown.

Accordingly, as of 2015, the title of the report is ‘Survey of territories affected by illicit crops. There is an entire mechanism involved in the knowledge of the impact, its quantification and the policy to eliminate it. Inscribing the presence of coca in a binary biological discourse of illness/health seeks to naturalise decisions made on behalf of the health of society as a whole. The underlying problems in the territories where coca production takes place in Colombia are approached from a drug policy that focuses on eradication – be it voluntary, forced manual eradication or aerial spraying. These problems are acknowledged insofar as addressing them will determine the ‘sustainability’ of eradication efforts. It is a complete inversion of priorities and the value given to what is important based on the naturalised strategic objective of ‘zero illicit crops’, an achievement that is celebrated by exalting the redemptive condition similar to the Christian notion of being ‘free from sin’, that is, a territory free from illicit crops.

The annual presentation of the reports makes headlines in mainstream media, promoting a rhetoric that glorifies and condemns territories that decrease or increase illicit crop cultivation, respectively. Furthermore, governments generally appropriate the results when it is convenient for them to do so, always with ‘area reduction’ as the indicator of success.

Finally, the reports make no reference to the other parts of the drug chain associated with drug trafficking, such as the involvement of the country’s legal infrastructure (ports, airports and border crossings), asset laundering, the participation of security agencies in drug smuggling, the financing of political campaigns with these resources, money laundering and corruption.  All of this contributes to the blurring of the lines between the legal and the illegal. This absence stimulates grey areas where business and exchanges take place among actors that have gained great political power and social legitimacy. The legal/illegal combination, which the UNODC ICMP methodological and technical structure is incapable of grasping, is the main instrument of the large-scale illegal drug economy.